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<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>A particular pattern which I have found very
helpful on the T-Bonds is what I call a Doji Sandwich. When it
appears on a pivot point or against a trend line, it more times than not
signifies a change in trend - and usually a strong one.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Last week saw the new June Contract on the S&P
end with the first two bars of the Doji Sandwich and if it completes the third
bar today, Monday, then I think there could be a significant change drop in
prices - certainly down to the trend line, if not much further down. (See
the attached GIF file)</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>At the moment the Bonds have been running in
contrary fashion to the S&P, but on Friday it broke out of a wedge, but the
bar closed well off the lows. If the Spoo goes down, then the Boos
should go up - that is until there is a major move down with stocks, which will
then probably see the Bonds move down too.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>As I write, the S&P is 15 points down, and the
T-Bonds have come back to Friday's opening - thus completing the downthrust to
take the market back into the wedge from which it (falsely?) broke out.
That is, again, normally a good pattern for an upward movement - so perhaps the
wedge has a little further to go before the real breakout.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Have a good week</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Bill Eykyn<BR><A
href="http://www.t-bondtrader.com";>www.t-bondtrader.com</A><BR>"Learn to read
the tape"</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV></BODY></HTML>
</x-html>From ???@??? Mon Mar 13 06:39:56 2000
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From: "JW" <JW@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "<realtraders@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
\"RealTraders \(post\)\"" <realtraders@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [RT] RE: RE: Greenspan is a complete fool... or an absolute genius!
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2000 03:19:43 -0800
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Status:
After reading the thread last week on AG (and the repost below
originally by William Fleckenstein), I'm flabbergasted that anyone could
say that AG really knows what he is doing and has respect for his
decisions. AG has simply taken advantage of being in the right place at
the right time. His attempt to single-handedly "manage" a soft-landing
for the economy will instead likely result in a severe recession or even
depression. What will people think then when unemployment is in double
digits? Will we still want to build an AG statue? Let's not abolish
facts along with the business cycle...
>> Al's less-than-perfect predictions... Rather than try to refute point
by point all of the claims that he made, I thought it might be more
instructive to illuminate for readers the fact that poor Alan Greenspan
has been no better and in fact quite a bit worse than many other
prognosticators over the past 20-25 years. Let me first say that we all
make mistakes, being human, and the future is never quite as clear as
the past. But having said that, I think it's important for folks to know
that Greenspan has missed many inflection points. This is especially
important since so many people have placed their faith - not to mention
their net worth and a good deal of borrowed money - on the fact that a)
he's going to pick the right interest rate to make everything work just
spectacularly and b) he's going to know exactly what to do when we have
a problem in the stock market. <<
JW
-----Original Message-----
From: listmanager@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:listmanager@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]On
Behalf Of James Taylor
Sent: Tuesday, March 07, 2000 8:01 PM
To: realtraders@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [RT] Alan Greenscam, Public ENEMY Number ONE
March 7, 2000
Alan Greenspan: friend or foe?
Author, William Fleckenstein
Alan Greenspan outdid himself in his speech Monday in Boston. He
entitled it, "The Revolution in Information Technology," although I call
it "An Ode to Technology." Quite frankly, in my opinion, it completely
embraced the new era and what wonderful things technology could do for
us. I found myself disagreeing with many different points that he made,
and agreeing with very few, other than the obvious that technology is
wonderful and it's made our lives better.
In my opinion, in his speech Greenspan has confused technology with the
bubble, the very same bubble that he has created. He has in essence been
reading the stock prices and doesn't realize what he has wrought. In a
Rap I wrote in early January, I had a piece about Alan Greenspan
inventing the Internet. I noted that since the fall of 1998 he printed
copious amounts of money, and then last year when he should have been
tightening, he panicked and printed even more money because of Y2K
concerns.
This fomented a bubble and money naturally flowed to the stocks with the
most imagination. That centered on the Internet and other
Internet-oriented ideas, as there was a lot of imagination potential and
few facts. Those stocks did the best and the leaders of those companies
were deemed to be visionaries, and whatever they proclaimed was
therefore to be the future. What Greenspan has basically done is believe
the action on the tape and the proclamations by the companies, and has
decided that the Internet and technology have truly revolutionized
everything in the most unique way.
The flaw in this analysis is that technology has been revolutionizing
the world for a very long time, and that does not allow one to pay
absolutely stupendous prices to sales ratios, price-to-earnings ratios,
etc. The Fed has fomented a bubble, and now the Fed has used the results
of that bubble to justify the fact that things are more or less on
course.
Al's less-than-perfect predictions... Rather than try to refute point by
point all of the claims that he made, I thought it might be more
instructive to illuminate for readers the fact that poor Alan Greenspan
has been no better and in fact quite a bit worse than many other
prognosticators over the past 20-25 years. Let me first say that we all
make mistakes, being human, and the future is never quite as clear as
the past. But having said that, I think it's important for folks to know
that Greenspan has missed many inflection points. This is especially
important since so many people have placed their faith - not to mention
their net worth and a good deal of borrowed money - on the fact that a)
he's going to pick the right interest rate to make everything work just
spectacularly and b) he's going to know exactly what to do when we have
a problem in the stock market.
So the question really is, should folks let everything ride on his
ability to divine the future and to always do the right thing? Does his
track record suggest that he is the man to bet on and is he the national
treasure that so many congressman have said that he is? I say no. His
record is littered with absolutely terrible calls at different
inflection points, so I'd like to reprise a few of his past predictions
and even some of his revisionist history of his past calls.
My purpose is not to be mean or vindictive. I'm sure that folks could
have fun with some of the things that I've said in the past. However, I
am not the Fed chairman, nor do I believe that I know the future and
know how to control the outcome of things as well as the Fed appears to
think it does. Furthermore, folks do not believe that I can, which is
not the case with Greenspan.
On the 1973 recession... I'd like to start off with a quote from Jan. 7,
1973. "It is very rare that you can be unqualifiedly bullish as you can
be now," Greenspan commented to the New York Times when he was president
of Townsend Greenspan. That was two days after the 1973 stock market
peak, when the market was on its way to declining 50 percent over two
years, and we endured the worst recession since the Great Depression.
On the S&L industry... The last thing that Alan Greenspan did before he
left Townsend Greenspan to become Fed Chairman, was to opine on the S&L
industry, and more precisely Charlie Keating's S&L. What follows is a
vignette from the book "Inside Job," written by Steven Pizzo, about an
encounter in 1984 between Greenspan and Ed Gray, who was the Federal
Home Loan Bank board chairman.
"Gray received a letter from respected economist Alan Greenspan telling
him he should stop worrying so much. Greenspan wrote that deregulation
was working just as planned, and he named 17 thrifts that had reported
record profits and were prospering under the new rules. Greenspan wrote
the letter while he was a paid consultant for Lincoln Savings & Loan of
Irvine, CA, owned by a Charles Keating, Jr., company. Four years after
Greenspan wrote the letter to Gray, 15 of the 17 thrifts he'd cited
would be out of business and would cost the FSLIC $3 billion in losses."
In addition, in 1985, Greenspan pronounced specifically that the
management of the Keating thrift enterprise was "seasoned and expert"
with a "record of outstanding success in making sound and profitable
direct investments." For that quote I'm indebted to Jim Grant's terrific
book, "The Trouble with Prosperity," which we will quote from again
later.
So those quotes provide a peek into the thinking of Alan Greenspan while
he was still in the private sector. By the time the 1990 economic
downturn rolled around, largely as a result of unsound banking practices
and most especially the S&Ls, he was the Fed chairman. And I think it is
most instructive to look at what he thought as we entered that recession
and what he later claims to have thought about that.
On the 1990 recession... For that bit of insight, I would like to quote
extensively from Jim Grant's book, because he did a superb job of
capturing what Greenspan said at the time and his later recollection of
what he said.
His 1994 version... "In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee in
May 1994, Alan Greenspan all but claimed that the Fed had acted alone.
`In the spring of 1989,' Greenspan led off, `we began to ease monetary
conditions as we observed the consequence of balance-sheet strains
resulting from increased debt. Households and businesses became much
more reluctant to borrow and spend, and lenders to extend credit - a
phenomenon often referred to as the `credit crunch.' In an endeavor to
defuse these financial strains, we moved short-term rates lower in a
long series of steps through the summer of 1992, and we held them at
unusually low levels through the end of 1993 - both absolutely, and,
importantly, relative to inflation. These actions, together with those
to reduce budget deficits, facilitated a significant decline in
long-term rates as well.'
"Students of the Greenspan record, listening to the chairman claim
credit for the restoration of American solvency, were left to wonder
what they had missed. Interest rates had fallen, of course, and the
broken financial economy had knitted. However, it was the first they had
heard of this commendable and forehanded course of action by the Federal
Reserve.
"It was not until October 1991 that the phrase `economic headwinds'
entered the Greenspan repertory. He used the metaphor to describe the
unprosperous gusts that were buffeting the aircraft GNP, the source of
which he identified as the debt predicament. However, it was a historic
observation rather than a predictive one. Bank stocks had reached low
ebb fully one year before Greenspan favored a Rhode Island audience with
this apercu; the stock market-assisted recapitalization of the banking
system was already long under way. In the midst of the overbuilding of
real estate and the overleveraging of corporate balance sheets in
1988-90, Greenspan had been inclined not to dwell on the issue of
credit, possibly because it had not yet, to him, become an issue. In
remarks titled `Innovation and Regulation of Banks in the 1990s' before
the American Bankers Association in October 1988, for example, he did
not mention the excessive lending against real estate that was being
carried out by members of his audience even as he spoke to them, and
that would be featured as one of the great regulatory issues in the
decade under examination.
His 1990 version... "In testimony before the Joint Economic Committee in
January 1990, on the eve of the failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert, a
signal event in the credit contraction of 1989-92, Greenspan did not
dwell on junk bonds, junk loans, failing banks, or in general on `the
consequence of balance-sheet strains resulting from increased debt,' as
he would put it in 1994. Although he did mention commercial real estate,
among other macroeconomic trouble spots, he did not let on that interest
rates would be progressively lowered to reduce the `financial strains'
he would see so clearly four years later, while looking backward: `But
such imbalances and dislocations as we see in the economy today probably
do not suggest anything more than a temporary hesitation in the
continuing expansion of the economy,' he wound up in that 1990
appearance. The messy default by Washington Bancorp on its unrated
commercial paper came only one week after a pronouncement by the Federal
Reserve Board, also based in Washington, D.C., that no generalized
credit contraction was under way."
The purpose of this exercise is to point out that Greenspan has
historically NOT had a strong grasp of the banking system or the
financial markets. (For the sake of brevity, I have not used rosy
scenario quotes from him just prior to the LTCM debacle.) He has,
however, been willing to ease, and ease aggressively, thereby creating
the right financial conditions for a mania. For this he is revered, but
yet printing money should not be confused with knowing what you are
doing. Greenspan is no Paul Volcker.
-----Original Message-----
From: listmanager@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:listmanager@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]On
Behalf Of Levent Erbora
Sent: Sunday, March 12, 2000 10:30 PM
To: <realtraders@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> "realtraders@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
Subject: [RT] RE: Greenspan is a complete fool... or an absolute genius!
Hi Bruce,
I have a great deal of respect for Uncle Greeny's intellect, brilliance
and what he has done for this country and the world in general.
And I think your "conspiracy theory" makes a whole lotta more sense than
anything else I've seen on the subject, here in this list or anywhere
else.
Best regards,
Levent
-----Original Message-----
From: BruceB [SMTP:bruceb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Sunday, March 12, 2000 11:56 PM
To: realtraders@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [RT] Greenspan is a complete fool... or an absolute genius!
For a few months now I've been coming to the painful conclusion that
Alan
Greenspan isn't a very unintelligent man...............
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