Bear Stearns was racing Sunday afternoon to sell 
  itself to JPMorgan Chase for more than $2 billion, according to 
  people involved in the talks. Meanwhile, Bear Stearns, whose solvency is in 
  question, was also making preparations to file for bankruptcy protection as a 
  backup plan should a deal not be reached, these people said.
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Mark Lennihan/Associated Press
  The headquarters of Bear Stearns on Madison Avenue in 
  Manhattan. 
A deal for Bear Stearns would end the independence of one of Wall 
  Street?s most storied firms and help halt a sweeping panic that set in at the 
  end of last week, causing Bear Stearns?s stock to swoon 47 percent on Friday. 
  If an agreement is not reached and Bear Stearns files for bankruptcy, it could 
  cause an even deeper global scare over the fate of the financial system.
  The talks, which are being overseen by the Federal Reserve and the 
  Treasury Department because of their potential effect on financial markets, 
  are being rushed in the hopes of reaching a deal before stock markets open in 
  Asia at 8 p.m. Eastern time.
  Bear Stearns?s chief executive, Alan D. Schwartz, and other top Bear 
  executives huddled in all-day meetings at the firm?s Madison Avenue 
  headquarters, trying desperately to persuade skeptical potential suitors that 
  the firm was worth buying for a price that would likely represent a steep 
  discount to its book value, considered the truest measure of the financial 
  health of a banking institution.
  JPMorgan has been balking at the deal in the absence of guarantees from 
  the Federal Reserve that its liabilities would be limited, people involved in 
  the talks said. JPMorgan was working with the Federal Reserve on Sunday 
  afternoon to hash out exactly what liabilities would be guaranteed, said these 
  people, who insisted on anonymity because they were not authorized to speak 
  publicly about the talks.
  On Friday, JPMorgan, with the backing of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, said it would 
  provide financing in order to keep Bear Stearns solvent as lenders and clients 
  rushed to pull their money out.
  At Friday?s closing price of $30 a share, Bear Stearns is valued at a 
  yawning 62 percent discount to the $80 book value that the firm has reported, 
  reflecting the broad view among investors that the fallout from the credit 
  crunch has permanently devastated Bear?s core mortgage operations.
  At a market capitalization of $3.5 billion, investors are concluding, for 
  now, that the business of one of Wall Street?s oldest investment banks is 
  perhaps worth no more than $2 billion, accounting for the firm?s midtown 
  skyscraper, which is probably worth at least $1 billion.
  Wall Street analysts say that the sudden collapse of Bear Stearns is not 
  likely to set off a wave of consolidation in the beleaguered financial 
  services industry. That is because the same fear that has paralyzed the 
  markets has paralyzed buyers.
  There is little faith in the assigned or ?marked? value of so many 
  assets, including but not limited to mortgage-related securities. In fact, the 
  experience of Bear Stearns proves that it is confidence, not capital, that 
  topples even the savviest financial institutions.
  ?Once you have a run on the bank you are in a death spiral and your 
  assets become worthless,? said David Trone, a brokerage analyst at Fox Pitt 
  Kelton. ?If JPMorgan can pull off a rescue, the assets can be saved,? he 
  argued. But if not, the assets may lose their value.
  According to Mr. Trone?s analysis, Bear Stearns?s best-case scenario 
  would be to sell for $60 a share, a value based on a few key assumptions: 
  clients stop pulling their business from Bear, the units produce half their 
  normal revenue, and the troubled securities are reduced in value by a 
  third.
  But the market did not put much faith in the Fed?s bailout of the firm, 
  announced on Friday, suggesting to Mr. Trone that it may have to sell for $30 
  or less. Bear Stearns?s hedge fund servicing business and its clearing 
  operations have traditionally been profitable operations, though they have 
  suffered in recent months as investors and lenders have lost confidence in 
  Bear.
  JPMorgan, the private equity investor J.C. Flowers and others have been 
  poring through Bear Stearns?s books since Friday, with the assistance of 
  Samuel Molinaro, Bear?s chief financial officer, and senior members from the 
  firm?s bond and mortgage operations.
  Throughout much of its history, Bear Stearns has masterfully persuaded 
  the market that its business ? narrowly focused on mortgage finance ? was 
  worth more than it actually was. To some degree this trick has been a 
  testament to the coy gamesmanship of two of its past leaders, Alan ?Ace? 
  Greenberg and James E. Cayne.
  Both men are devout bridge players, and Mr. Greenberg is an amateur 
  magician to boot, so they are well schooled in the art of not showing their 
  hand. Mr. Cayne?s hint eight years back ? that he would sell the firm only for 
  four times its book value ? was even then a flight of financial fancy.
  Wall Street investment banks rarely command such a premium to their book 
  value, given the inherent and unpredictable risks of their business. 
  Nevertheless, Mr. Cayne and Mr. Greenberg were adept at spreading the view 
  that Bear Stearns was constantly being pursued by buyers as varied as European 
  commercial banks and even banks like JPMorgan, though it was never clear that 
  any of these talks reached a serious level.
  But Bear Stearns?s quirky culture and the high pay it awarded its senior 
  executives made it a difficult fit for larger, more staid institutions, and it 
  always seemed that Mr. Greenberg and Mr. Cayne were having too much fun 
  running their business to sell it to an outsider.
  Now Mr. Schwartz, a longtime investment banker whose approach to 
  deal-making is more pragmatic and results-oriented than his predecessor, is 
  racing against the clock to seal a deal that salvages some measure of value 
  for shellshocked Bear Stearns employees, who own more than 30 percent of the 
  firm, and its investors.
  ?Banks and brokerages are a house of cards built on the confidence of 
  clients, creditors and counterparties,? Mr. Trone said. ?If you take chunks 
  out of that confidence, things can go awry pretty quickly. It could happen to 
  any one of the brokers.?