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From: <A
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To: <A href=""
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Sent: Wednesday, August 06, 2003 7:20 AM
Subject: Mises and His School
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Mises
and His School
by J.G.
Hülsmann
[Posted August 6, 2003]
This is the opening lecture to
the <A
href=""><FONT
face="Verdana, Helvetica" size=2>Mises University<FONT
face="Verdana, Helvetica" size=2>, delivered August 3, 2003
<IMG align=right alt="" border=0
src="">What is Austrian Economics?
A few years ago, at the University of Paris, I gave a course with the title
"Introduction to Austrian Economics." It turned out that some of the students
who signed up for the course believed it was meant to deal with business
conditions in the country that lies between Germany, Switzerland, Italy,
Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. They were very surprised by the
content of my lectures. To be fair, it must be said that one of them stayed on
throughout the course. One lady was glad to discover that Austria had brought
forth a school of economic thought that up to the present day enjoys a living
tradition in the entire world.
Austrian Economics is a body of ideas,
and we are here this week to study these ideas. That in itself is already an
exciting and instructive activity. After all, the history of ideas is a
fascinating subject. However, I take it that most of you have not come to Auburn
because you are merely interested in ideas as such. You are interested in ideas
that are true—ideas that properly reflect the workings of the real world to
which they refer. You are interested in gaining an adequate understanding of the
world of social relationships, and in sharpening your judgment in political
matters.
If this is what you desire, you have
come to the right place. The faculty of our summer university is not a group of
bookish scholars that share an antiquarian interest in the history of ideas.
Rather, they are intellectuals who not only believe that ideas make a difference
in society and politics, but who are firmly convinced that ideas alone reign
supreme when it comes to political decision-making; and that, therefore, it is
of crucial importance for the welfare of our families, regions, nations, and all
of mankind that the best available knowledge be applied in matters
political.
The reason for the existence of the
Mises Institute is that the works of its name patron, Ludwig von Mises, are the
best available foundation for an adequate understanding of the issues involved
in political decision making. In a word, the very point of Austrian Economics,
as embodied in the works of Mises, is that it is the foremost political science
of our day. It is far more systematic, rigorous, and penetrating than anything
else in the field.
This is also the conviction of the
faculty assembled here to instruct you during the coming week. This does not
mean that we agree among ourselves on each single issue, and neither does it
mean that we agree with Mises on all issues. Science is after all very much a
work in progress. It does not provide ultimate answers such as revealed
religion. It is only a special way, even though a very powerful way, to find
guidance for our actions.
In a word, the works of Mises are not
something like holy writ for our faculty, and neither should they be for you.
But they are a precious starting point for further explorations and critical
corrections, and a rich fountain of inspiration.
Who Was Mises
Ludwig von Mises was born in 1881 in
Lemberg, a provincial capital of what was at the time the second-largest country
of Europe: Austria-Hungary. His father was a railroad engineer in Lemberg who
had married a lady from a bourgeois family in Vienna, the capital of the
country. Both parents were Jews and Mises too received the standard religious
education. Let me mention in this context that, although he later became
agnostic, he never lost his respect for religious life. In many of his writings
and correspondence he also stressed that there was no contradiction whatever
between libertarian political views and faith.
When Ludwig was still a small boy, the
family moved to Vienna, where his father had obtained employment in the railroad
ministry. At the age of eleven, Ludwig entered some sort of an early-age
college, where during the next eight years he received a humanistic education.
The main subjects taught were Latin (eight hours per week) and Greek (six
hours).
Young Ludwig had at that point already
developed a vigorous interest in history and politics. He devoured a great
number of books on various periods of the history of his country, and it was in
these years that he developed the spirit of criticism that is so essential for
scientific work and which served him well during the rest of his life. The
interest he displayed for the history of his own country, and more specifically
for contemporary history, foreshadowed much of his later intellectual
development. He was not interested in history merely for its own sake. The point
was to learn from the past the lessons necessary to guide action here and
now.
When Mises finished school at the age
of nineteen, therefore, he signed up as a student at the department of law and
government science at the University of Vienna, which in those days was one of
the top universities in the entire world. He joined the seminar of Carl
Grünberg, an economic historian who studied the evolution of peasant life in
Eastern Europe. Grünberg had him write a dissertation on the conditions leading
to the liberation of peasants in Galicia, the province in which Mises was born.
It was his first academic work and so impressive in the eyes of his professors
that it was immediately published as a monograph by the university
press.
Mises continued to study the economic
condition of the working classes, and under the guidance of Grünberg he learned
to understand history as resulting from the interplay of special interests. This
bode him well for the rest of his life. In his later works on economic theory,
Mises accorded due attention to "the clash of group interests," as he called it,
something that distinguished him from many other theorists.
Thus Mises started off as an economic
historian, and he very probably would have become a great champion of the
so-called Historical School of Economics, which dominated in those days the
social-science departments in Germany and Austria. But then something unexpected
happened that turned him away from fact gathering, as it was practised by the
Historical School, and toward the study of economic theory. Around Christmas of
1903, Mises had his first exposure to Austrian Economics when he read Carl
Menger's Principles of Economics.
He later said that it was this reading
that turned him into an economist. For the rest of his life, Mises would say
that books are the best university. This one book certainly made a huge
difference in his life.
Menger convinced Mises that historical
research, important though it was, did not cover all layers of social reality.
There was an entire universe of things that played a crucial role in human
conduct, but which could not be grasped by empirical field studies or archival
work. Scarcity, value, intentions, choice, error, and uncertainty were such
things. They could only be grasped through an intellectual process of reflection
or meditation, and knowledge about these things was not "history," but
"theory."
After reading Menger, Mises turned
back to the great classic works of economic science, to Hume, Smith, Say, and
Ricardo. And he came to see that theory was not merely necessary for a full
understanding of human behavior, but also that theory alone provided a firm
guidance in all practical matters, in particular, in political
decisionmaking.
The Historical School could not offer
such guidance. One of its critics, writing in Mises's day, said that the method
of this school verged on the absurd. "They go into workers' apartments, measure
the surface, and then claim that they are too small." (Ludwig Pohle) But by
which standards were the apartments too small? And even if one came to agree
that the living conditions of workers were not very good by some absolute
standard, it was not at all clear which political consequences this entailed.
For the crucial question was whether government interventions could improve
these conditions at all. Historical enquiry could not answer this question,
theory could.
Hence, Mises became a theoretician—in
fact, the foremost economic theoretician of the 20th century—not for the sake of
intellectual pleasure derived from playing with constructions of his own making.
He had no talent to be some sort of an early game theorist or
general-equilibrium model builder. He became a theoretician because Menger had
shown that theory could describe a part of reality that was not covered by any
other type of knowledge. In short, it was Mises's quest for greater realism and
his interest in practical questions that led him to study and develop pure
theory in the way Carl Menger had done it before him.
When Mises became interested in
Menger's work, Menger himself had already retired from the University of Vienna.
He had left the field to his two most important disciples, both of whom taught
at this University from 1905 onwards. Their names were Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and
Friedrich von Wieser.
Wieser's work was inspired at least as
much by the Englishmen Jevons as it was based on Menger's Principles.
Like Jevons, indeed, much like present-day theoreticians, Wieser made in his
theories ample use of fictions. The central element of his economic thought was
the concept of "natural value." This type of value had nothing to do with the
wealth of any concrete acting person, and it was objective in the sense that it
was the same for all persons.
Yet although his analysis of value was
much less realistic than Menger's, Wieser felt no inhibitions to derive sweeping
political conclusions from his constructions. The fact that real-life economies
were necessarily different from economies in which natural value reigned, did in
his eyes not count against his theory; it counted against the real world. He saw
in his brainchild of natural value an economic ideal and recommended that
economic policy should make sure that all factors of production be
treated according to their natural values. According to Wieser, this might be
achieved in a perfect communist state. But it might also be achieved through
heavy government intervention in the market economy.
In his early years, Mises was very
sympathetic to Wieser's policy stance, but he was not at all impressed with his
lack of realism. Rather than attending any one of Wieser's classes, Mises
attended the classes of the man who seemed to represent most faithfully the
Mengerian legacy, and who was also in Carl Menger's own judgment his most
important follower.
Starting in the fall of 1905, Eugen
von Böhm-Bawerk conducted a graduate seminar at the University of Vienna. He had
just retired from his position as a Minister of Finance and dedicated the last
years of his life (he died in 1914) to research and writing, and also to some
debating in the Austrian House of Lords. Mises graduated in early 1906, but he
continued to attend Böhm-Bawerk's seminar until the very end. It was here that
he received his final polish as an economics student and, most importantly, it
was here that he formed his ideas about what a professor should be
like.
At the same time, Mises did the
research on his first great theoretical treatise in the Mengerian spirit, the
Theory of Money and Credit. Let me mention in passing that Mises could
work on the project only in the evening and night hours. He never found a full
paid university position in Vienna, and therefore had to earn a living with
other activities. In 1909, he accepted a job at the local chamber of commerce
and remained an employee until he left Vienna in 1934, when he finally did
obtain a university chair—in Geneva, Switzerland.
After some five years of hard work in
his spare-time, then, Mises published his treatise on money in 1912. Some
sixteen other books would follow in the coming years and decades. But the money
book belonged to the four truly great books that he had written and which every
student of Austrian Economics should read. The other three great books have the
titles Socialism (first published in 1922), Human Action
(1940/1949), and Theory and History (1956).
Money
In the Theory of Money and
Credit, Mises demonstrated that Carl Menger's value theory could also be
applied to the case of money. Menger himself, as well as Böhm-Bawerk, had left
money out of their considerations. Following the classical economists—Hume,
Smith, Say, Ricardo, Mill—they had assumed that, ultimately, money does not have
an impact on the wealth of nations; real factors alone determine productivity
and incomes.
Critics of the Austrian School had
argued that this neglect was a rather serious shortcoming. Money was in fact
quite unlike all the other goods when it came to the relationship between value
and price. In the case of other goods, the price resulted from the interaction
of the subjective values of different individuals. Value was the cause of price.
But in the case of money, there was no such one-sided causal determination. The
value of money certainly had some impact on the formation of money prices, but
money prices were themselves causes of the value of money. A unit of money with
a higher purchasing power was after all more valuable, ceteris paribus,
than a unit with a lower purchasing power. But if this was true, there seemed to
be an inescapable circle: the value of money determined money prices, and these
prices in turn determined the value of money—some sort of a chicken-egg
problem.
The first Austrian to take up the
challenge was Friedrich von Wieser, but unfortunately he again came up with a
theoretical construct based by and large on fiction. The challenge had remained
unanswered.
It was in this situation that Mises
stepped in and provided a truly Mengerian "realist" solution. He showed that the
use of money was determined by marginal value, just as the use of any other
good. The key to his demonstration was the regression theorem. Mises argued that
the circle in the explanation of money prices was only apparent. It was not the
case that marginal value determined the formation of money prices, and that
these very same money prices in some sort of a feedback process determined the
values from which they had sprung. Rather there was a time component in the
chain of causation. Market participants relied in their present value judgments
on the money prices of the past, not on the money prices that in the
present resulted from those present value judgments.
But what about those past money
prices? How did they come into existence? Through the same process. They
resulted from value judgments that relied on money prices existing even further
back in time. The same explanation could be applied to all money prices existing
in times past. Each time one had to go back to somewhat older prices.
But was this not an infinite
regression—and thus a nonexplanation? Mises argued this was not the case. If one
went back far enough, one would reach the point at which money emerged from some
pre-existing commodity that had not been used in indirect exchange. At this
point, money prices would result from values that were based on the nonmonetary
uses of these commodities.
Mises's regression theorem has
remained one of the core elements of Austrian price theory, and more recently it
has found an important new application in the field of currency competition.
Indeed, the regression theorem tells us that it is impossible to launch a new
paper money in the way one would launch any other new product on the market.
Nobody would have any idea about the purchasing power of such a new paper money,
precisely because it is new, and thus the market participants could not evaluate
it.
Mises made other important
contributions in his Theory of Money and Credit. He delivered a thorough
analysis of the redistribution effects that go hand in hand with changes in the
money supply. Additional quantities of money reach certain individuals first and
allow them to bid up prices and thus to buy commodities that would otherwise
have been bought by other market participants. It follows that money is never
neutral. It has a profound impact on the allocation of resources through time
and space.
But the single best-known contribution
of the Theory of Money and Credit is probably its business-cycle theory,
which Mises called the circulation-credit theory of the business cycle and which
is today usually called the Austrian theory of the business cycle. Mises argued
that the business cycle results from fractional-reserve banking. Under a
fractional-reserve banking system, bankers can create money substitutes ex
nihilo and give these substitutes to their customers in the form of
fiduciary credit or circulation credit.
When this happens, the new supply of
fiduciary credit reduces interest rates below the equilibrium level. This in
turn distorts entrepreneurial calculations. At the lower interest rate, more
investment projects appear to be profitable than would otherwise have been the
case. But this impression is fallacious because the quantities of real resources
have not increased. It is not possible to complete any additional investments
projects. If entrepreneurs, deluded by the increased availability of fiduciary
credit, launch new investment projects, they squander resources and set the
economy on a crash course. It is physically impossible to complete all the
projects that have been started, because there are just not enough real
resources. Sooner or later a decision must be made where to put the available
resources; all other projects must be abandoned. This is what happens in the
bust phase of the business cycle.
Let me draw your attention to the
implications of this theory for the interpretation of the boom phase and the
so-called bust phase of the business cycle. In the popular mind, the boom is a
period of growth—certainly an exuberant growth, but growth nevertheless. And the
bust is a period of stagnation and destruction.
By contrast, in the light of Mises's
business cycle theory, one understands that the apparent improvement of things
in the boom is just that—an illusion. What really happens is that scarce
resources are wasted and society as a whole is therefore objectively
impoverished. The illusion springs from the fact that the wasting goes hand in
hand with a simultaneous redistribution process (remember: money is not
neutral). Some members of society do improve their lot during the boom,
and because public attention is on these happy fates, the general impoverishment
goes unnoticed.
Similarly, the bust or—as it is
sometimes called—the crisis is not, as in the popular perception, the beginning
of all trouble. Rather, it is the beginning of a new sanity. The outbreak of the
crisis occurs at the very moment when entrepreneurial fantasies meet the hard
rock of economic reality, and finally cease. Entrepreneurs now abandon projects
that cannot be continued with the available resources, and they watch out for
new projects that are better adapted to present conditions. There is some
stagnation in a crisis, but from the point of view of the Austrian business
cycle theory, stagnation is certainly better than a continued boom, because
after all it does not waste resources.
Socialism
The next major contribution that needs
to be mentioned is Mises's critique of socialism.
The first champions of socialism had
depicted their ideal society as some sort of a small self-contained egalitarian
community. Then the classical economists pointed out that living in autarky is
not very productive. The socialist projects would therefore tend to be islands
of misery in a capitalist world; and it was very unlikely that many people would
be attracted by such prospects.
The socialist intellectuals could not
help but accept this critique, but now they came up with a new idea. They
claimed that central planning, the characteristic feature of socialism, was more
productive than the anarchy of the market. It made no sense to establish
socialism in little islands. What was needed was worldwide central planning, or
at any rate central planning on as large a scale as possible. This was the state
of the debate at the end of World War I, when Mises set out to critically
examine the socialist tenets.
In one of the greatest economics
articles ever written, Mises once and for all destroyed the claim that central
planning would make production in society more efficient than the division of
labor in a market economy. The article had the title "Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im
sozialistischen Gemeinwesen."
What is a rational allocation of
resources? The allocation of a resource unit is rational when this unit is used
in a project that is more important than any other project in which it could
also have been employed. Hence, the rationality or nonrationality of a resource
use is to be decided on the basis of a comparison between alternative uses of
that resource.
Now Mises raised the crucial question:
What is the standard of comparison? In terms of which criterion can or should we
compare investment alternatives? Mises pointed out that a market economy could
use the profitability criterion. For all investments, entrepreneurs can estimate
the selling proceeds as well as the cost expenditure in terms of money prices.
And then they can compare the ratios that spring from these
estimates.
Let us notice that entrepreneurs are
of course not somehow compelled to only look on profitability when they make
their decisions. The point is that they can look at the profitability criterion,
and that in the light of this criterion all investment alternatives in a market
economy are indeed comparable.
Now what about a socialist economy?
Mises argued that monetary calculation is here out of the question. For money
prices can only come into existence in market exchanges, and market exchanges
presuppose the existence of at least two owners. But in socialism there is only
one owner of all means of production—the very definition of socialism—and thus
there are no prices for factors of production. It follows that it is impossible,
in a socialist regime, to calculate a profit rate for any investment project and
to compare the profitability of different alternative investments.
The central planning agency of a
socialist society is therefore deprived of the very means of economic
rationalism. It is confronted by a huge array of heterogeneous resources,
but it cannot compare the conceivable alternative uses of these resources in
terms of a common unit. For example, one cannot tell whether 1,000,000 gallons
of milk are somehow more (or less) than the 1,000 cows that produce this milk,
just as it is impossible to say whether a castle park is more (or less) than the
100 gardeners that brought it in shape. All these things are heterogeneous and
cannot therefore be compared quantitatively—the problem of adding up apples and
oranges. For the same reason it is also impossible to tell whether using the
cows to produce the milk is more efficient than using the gardeners to
bring the garden in shape.
Only if all of these things are
exchanged against money can we make such quantitative comparisons, namely, by
comparing their money prices. It follows that while capitalism is a truly
rational economic system, socialism is like a huge ship without a compass. Far
from overcoming the alleged "anarchy of production," socialism actually produces
more chaos than would have existed without the imposition of central planning.
Socialism, as Mises would say, is planned chaos.
Epistemology
You might think that, with his
business cycle theory and his critique of socialism, Mises had stirred up more
than enough trouble for a lifetime. But I can only encourage all of you to read
his books, in particular the four great books, very carefully. Each of them is a
rich mine of insights and arguments. Tonight we cannot do more than go through
some of the highlights.
Let me therefore move on to another
one of these highlights: Mises's clarification of the epistemology of economics.
Mises stated that economic science is a particular branch of a more general
science—praxeology, the science of human action. The laws of this science are
valid a priori, that is, they cannot possibly be refuted or verified by
any facts that we gather through our senses. They can only be verified or
refuted by discursive reasoning, which in turn is based on our reflective
knowledge of what human action is.
Let me give you just one example.
Consider first the most basic phenomenon that lies at the heart of all modern
economic theories: human choice. There is absolutely no doubt that human beings
can make choices and do make choices, and that, if it were not so, it would be
pointless to engage in economic science at all (and several other disciplines
such as ethics and law would of course be pointless as well). No school of
economics disputes this fact, neither the monetarists, nor the supply-siders,
nor the Walrasians, nor the game theorists, nor the Keynesians (old, new, post,
and whatever sort of Keynesianism we will get yet).
Now ask yourselves how we come to know
about the existence of choice. Do we actually observe choices with our eyes? Do
we hear choices? Do we smell them? Clearly, this is not the case. But this means
that the most basic phenomenon of economic science is known to us, not by facts
we gather through our senses, but through an act of reflection on our own
actions. And the knowledge that we gain this way does therefore not depend on
information we gather from our senses, and thus it cannot be refuted or verified
by any such information. It can only be verified or refuted by a more exact
reflection on the structural features of our actions.
This is why Mises is right in his
claim that economic science is valid a priori. And all other
economists, who believe that economics is empirical in the very same sense in
which for example the natural sciences are empirical are wrong.
Most mainstream economists have never
given any serious thought to the epistemology of their science. They just repeat
the slogans of a few academic high priests, who endlessly profess the litany of
positivism, the doctrine according to which all scientific knowledge comes from
observed facts or other sense-based methods of fact gathering. These words might
sound harsh to some of you, but it is no exaggeration to say that positivism,
despite all beneficial effects it might have had at some point in the past, has
today become a quasi-religious creed. We can be sure that Auguste Comte, the
founding father of positivism, now marvels in his grave, because that is exactly
what he had in mind: replacing Christianity with his brainchild.
This bad new religion does not make
good weather for the Austrians. Today mainstream economists disdain Mises and
his followers for shunning empirical work and engaging in the armchair
gymnastics of a priori theorizing. Many mainstream economists cannot
pronounce the words "a priori theorizing" without grinding their
teeth.
Milton Friedman once characterised
a priori theorizing as a deadly undertaking. If two Austrians disagree,
according to Friedman, there is only one solution left for them: they have to
shoot it out.
Now I can assure you that in the ten
years or so during which I have had the opportunity to observe the Austrians at
a fairly close distance, it never ever came to a shooting, all the while we
constantly disagreed with Mises, Rothbard, and amongst ourselves. The Mises
Institute is located in Alabama, a state blessed with very liberal gun laws.
There is no problem whatever to go to one of our nice local gun shops, buy a
decent weapon, and so prepared go to the Mises Summer University or to the
Austrian Scholar's Conference to apply Friedman's precept. But nobody has ever
done this.
I therefore think it is high time now
that Friedman finally accepts the historical record as an empirical refutation
of his hypothesis. But I doubt he will.
When two Austrians disagree, they do
not shoot it out; rather, each of them tries to come up with a better argument
next time, but usually the disagreements remain. Things are not at all different
in mainstream economics. It is a grave error to believe that empirical field
studies provide something like a final verdict on a contested question. The
empirical record shows that disagreements between positivists remain in the face
of even the most impressive findings.
If anything, therefore, Friedman's
horror scenario applies with equal right to the positivist camp. If two
positivists disagree and refuse to accept each other's empirical studies as the
final word, there remains only one solution: the trigger. But of course this is
as nonsensical as it is in the case of disagreements between Austrians. Science
is a process; it is never something like a final state of rest. Disagreements
are not only unavoidable; they are also necessary and even beneficial to spur
scientific progress.
So much for Friedman's errors. But
even many Austrian fellow travelers feel uncomfortable about Mises's views on
what economics is all about. They encourage students of Austrian Economics to
leave the ivory tower and apply the theory in empirical work.
This recommendation also rests on
a serious misunderstanding. Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard, Hans
Hoppe, and many other excellent Austrians engage in a priori theorizing
not because they shun empirical work, but precisely because a priori
theorizing is the only way to adequately describe certain features of the real
world, without which it would be impossible to fully understand human behavior
and to give a scientific underpinning to political decision-making.
If anything, we need not less
exercises in pure theory, but much more of it. It is true that not everybody is
born to be a theorist and that applied historical case studies have a great
pedagogical value. But the future of our science, and thus the future of our
civilization will depend on the number of young intellectuals willing to learn
pure theory in the realist tradition of Menger and Mises, and to develop this
tradition to the best of their abilities.
Realism
This brings us to a final issue. As I
just said, it is important that we develop praxeology in the realist tradition
of Menger and Mises. Austrians should not become more like the mainstream, based
on the false hope that thereby our ideas will become more palatable to
academics. Turning Austrian economics into just another branch of the mainstream
will at best flatter the little egos of the protagonists. Austrians should
become and be all that they can be as the bearers of realist economic theory.
But they can do this only if they are willing to immerse themselves in the
tradition of Austrian realism.
This tradition is most vividly present
in the works of the main line of Austrian theorists: Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, Mises,
Rothbard, and today in the works of Hans-Hermann Hoppe and the other senior
fellows of the Mises Institute, as well as in the works of a few others, such as
Jesús Huerta de Soto, Pascal Salin, and George Reisman. It is less present in
the works of Friedrich von Wieser, Friedrich von Hayek, and those who, following
in their footsteps, place too much emphasis on the use of fictitious
constructions, for example, on the equilibrium construct and on processes of
equilibration.
The quest for greater realism in the
social sciences—this is the core mission of Misesian scholarship in our times.
At its heart this is a quest for the full truth, and even though we cannot
expect to ever gain a full picture of anything here on earth, we will try to get
as close as we can in the coming week. If Misesians remain faithful to their
mission, it will not fail to yield a rich harvest. For not only the truth, but
the mere honest quest for realism has a great power of attraction.
It has brought the Austrians important
converts from the mainstream. For example, at the beginning of the twentieth
century, Ludwig von Mises himself defected from the mainstream of his time—the
Historical School. In the 1970s, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, who is among us tonight,
defected from the mainstream philosophy of the Frankfurt School; and in the
1980s, Jeffrey Herbener, also here tonight, defected from neoclassical
economics.
Today the Austrian School is a vibrant
and growing movement of economists, historians, philosophers, and other social
scientists united in their love for the search of truth and in their courage to
say the truth even if it does not fit the political or academic fashions of our
day. There is no better place and no better occasion to become acquainted with
this movement than the Summer University here at the Mises Institute, and I hope
you will make good use of it.
J.G. Hülsmann is a senior fellow in residence at the Mises Institute.
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