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In the light of today's development in gold the article below should be of interest to most.
It appeared a few days ago, and may be one of the sīreasons for todays rally.
>By Reginald H. Howe
>www.GoldenSextant.com
>February 1, 2000
>
>Last week the world's movers and shakers held their
>annual confab in Davos, Switzerland. Bill C. and Bill
>G. were there. No doubt the scandal enveloping Helmut
>Kohl, Europe's greatest statesman since Churchill and
>De Gaulle, provided much grist for gossip. But here at
>home some began to glimpse the outline of a possible
>new Clinton scandal -- one that could ultimately
>eclipse Watergate or Teapot Dome.
>
>Evidence is accumulating that the administration of
>Bill Clinton may have turned the Exchange Stabilization
>Fund (the "ESF") into a political slush fund to make
>itself look good and simultaneously profit some of its
>closest Wall Street friends and supporters.
>
>Specifically, the known facts support credible
>allegations that the Clinton administration has
>effectively capped the gold price by using the ESF to
>backstop the selling of gold futures and other gold
>derivative products by politically well-connected
>bullion banks. Such interference in the free market
>price of gold would undermine its traditional role as a
>leading indicator of inflation. And it would do so at
>the same time that the administration's many
>adjustments to the Consumer Price Index have rendered
>that lagging indicator of inflation also suspect. Among
>the bullion banks most heavily involved in selling gold
>futures and purveying gold loans, forward sales, and
>other derivatives that undercut its price is Goldman
>Sachs, former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin's old
>firm.
>
>These are serious allegations, but the current
>administration scarcely merits much benefit of the doubt.
>If these allegations are incorrect, Treasury Secretary
>Summers can deny them in unequivocal language as
>Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan did two weeks ago with
>regard to similar allegations of gold price manipulation by
>the Fed. Indeed, in a formal letter to Sen. Joseph I.
>Lieberman, D-Conn., the Fed chairman not only denied
>that the Fed had intervened in the gold or gold derivatives
>markets but added: "Most importantly, the Federal Reserve
>is in complete agreement with the proposition that any
>such transactions on our part, aimed at manipulating the
>price of gold or otherwise interfering in the free trade of
>gold, would be wholly inappropriate." Greenspan's letter
>may be read at:
>
>http://www.egroups.com/group/gata/346.html?
>
>The odd behavior of the gold price over the past five
>years, including massive gold leasing and heavy bouts
>of futures selling apparently timed to abort threatened
>rallies, has generated considerable speculation
>regarding intentional manipulation by governmental
>authorities. What has made weakness in the gold price
>all the more perplexing are mounting shortfalls of new
>mine production relative to annual demand. Because most
>nations deal in gold through their central banks, they
>are prime suspects.
>
>Clarifying remarks that he made to Congress in 1998,
>Greenspan confirmed in his letter to Senator Lieberman
>that some central banks other than the Fed do in fact
>lease gold on occasion for the express purpose of
>trying to contain its price. Gold leased by central
>banks to bullion banks is typically sold by them into
>the market in connection with arranging forward sales
>by gold mining companies or making gold loans to mining
>companies or others. The attraction of gold loans is
>their typically low interest rates (known in the trade
>as "lease rates") of around 2 percent.
>
>The Fed and the Exchange Stabilization Fund are the
>only arms of the U.S. government with broad statutory
>authority "to deal in gold" and thus by reasonable
>extension in gold futures and derivatives. Were the Fed
>to engage in such activities, it would of necessity
>have to do so subject to all the institutional
>safeguards that govern its more important functions.
>
>But unlike the Fed, the ESF is virtually without
>institutional structure or safeguards. It is under the
>exclusive control of the secretary of the treasury,
>subject only to the approval of the president. Indeed,
>direct control and custody of the ESF must rest at all
>times with the president and the secretary. The statute
>further provides (31 U.S.C. s. 5302(a)(2)): "Decisions
>of the secretary are final and may not be reviewed by
>another officer or employee of the government."
>
>Originally funded out of the profits from the 1934 gold
>confiscation, the little-known ESF is available for
>intervention in the foreign exchange markets. In the
>absence of a congressional appropriation, the Clinton
>administration used funds from the ESF to finance the
>1995 U.S. bailout of Mexico. However, accepting the
>Greenspan dictum that it "would be wholly
>inappropriate" for the Fed ever to intervene in the
>gold market to manipulate the price, it is hard to
>imagine any situation in which such intervention would
>be appropriate by the ESF, never mind one involving
>large profits for the former investment bank of the
>secretary himself.
>
>Last week in response to an inquiry from Bridge News,
>Secretary Summers "categorically denied" that the
>Treasury was selling gold. With all due respect to the
>secretary, this is not the allegation that
>knowledgeable gold market participants and observers
>are making. Their allegation is that the ESF -- by
>writing gold call options or otherwise -- is making
>sufficient gold cover available to certain bullion
>banks to allow them safely to take large short
>positions in gold, thereby putting downward pressure on
>the price and, in the process, making huge profits for
>themselves.
>
>Two devices that have put the most pressure on the gold
>price in recent years are sales of gold futures
>contracts on certain public exchanges, the COMEX in New
>York being the largest and most important, and sales of
>leased gold in connection with gold loans and forward
>selling by miners. Bullion banks that engage in these
>activities must of necessity take short positions in
>gold. While these positions can result in large profits
>for them when the gold price declines, they can -- if
>unhedged -- also result in large losses should the gold
>price rise.
>
>The most common tactic used by bullion banks to hedge
>against such losses is the purchase of gold call
>options, usually from gold producers, other large
>holders of physical gold, or entities with sufficient
>financial resources to guarantee cash settlement. In
>the absence of such protection, bullion banks leasing
>gold or selling large amounts of gold futures contracts
>for their own account (or the accounts of any but the
>strongest gold credits) would be forced to assume risky
>net short positions on which they could sustain huge
>losses in the event of an upward spike in the gold
>price. At the same time, sellers (often called
>"writers") of gold call options also assume risk, for
>they will be called upon to provide gold (or equivalent
>cash settlement) to the bullion banks in the event that
>the gold price rises above the strike prices of the
>options.
>
>Given its own resources of something like $40 billion
>and its connection to the U.S. Treasury, which controls
>the nation's official gold reserves of about 8,150
>metric tonnes, the ESF has the ability to write gold
>call options in circumstances where private parties
>would not. Should it do so, it can effectively permit
>favored bullion banks to engage in gold futures selling
>and gold leasing under conditions where they would
>otherwise be forced to curtail these activities as
>perceptions of increasing risk rendered call options
>from private sources either too expensive or even
>unavailable. What is more, the ESF can write these
>options clandestinely so as to camouflage the true
>source of what otherwise appears as inexplicable
>downward pressure on gold, thereby creating market
>uncertainty that itself augments bearish sentiment and
>increases the profits of bullion banks privy to the
>scheme.
>
>With the Fed's announcement that it, unlike some other
>central banks, does not operate in the gold or gold
>derivatives markets, the focus of suspicion naturally
>shifted to the ESF. But to understand fully why gold
>market participants and observers increasingly sense
>market manipulation originating somewhere in the U.S.
>government, it is necessary to recount and highlight
>some recent history of the gold market, particularly
>for those not fully conversant with it. And even for
>those who are, Fed Chairman Greenspan's recent letter
>requires reassessment of working hypotheses involving
>assumptions of gold price manipulation by the Fed. More
>detail on much of what follows can be found in earlier
>essays and commentaries here at The Golden Sextant,
>together with various links to supporting or
>explanatory information.
>
>The story begins in 1995. Gold is slumbering as it has
>for some time around US$375/oz. Japan's economic
>situation is worsening, and in mid-1995 the Japanese
>cut interest rates sharply. Gold begins to stir,
>jumping over $400 in early 1996, propelled in part by
>Japanese interest rates so low that they force yen
>denominated gold futures on the TOCOM into
>backwardation (that is, when prices for future delivery
>are lower than spot). The yen is falling; gold lease
>rates are rising. From the U.S. perspective, an
>economic collapse in Japan threatens to exacerbate the
>U.S. trade deficit and possibly trigger massive
>dishoarding of Japan's large holdings of dollar
>denominated debt, including U.S. Treasuries.
>
>>From the European perspective, there is concern not
>only about the obvious economic effects of a Japanese
>collapse, but also that it might cause sufficient
>disruption in the existing international payments
>system to complicate severely or even prevent the
>planned introduction of the euro in 1999. An
>accelerating gold price responding to world financial
>turmoil is hardly a propitious environment for the
>introduction of a new and untested currency.
>
>The G-7 central banks and finance ministers cobble
>together a plan to support Japan, including a strategy
>for controlling the gold price through anti-gold
>propaganda backed by small but highly publicized
>official gold sales augmented by leasing of official
>gold in large quantities at concessionary rates. For
>Belgium and the Netherlands, the largest European
>sellers, gold sales also help to meet the Maastricht
>Treaty's criteria for the euro.
>
>Gold analysts, who at the beginning of 1996 were almost
>unanimous in predicting a new bull market for gold, are
>blindsided. Virtually none foresaw such a coordinated
>official attack on gold, and many are slow to recognize
>its broad scope. The gold price steadily declines from
>more than $400 in early 1996 to well under $300 in
>early 1998 and stays under $300 for most of 1998 and
>into early 1999. Every time gold looks to rally, it is
>slammed on the LBMA or COMEX by the same small
>group of well-connected bullion banks. Particularly notable
>in these attacks are Goldman Sachs, Chase, and Mitsui,
>which regularly runs by far the largest net short position
>on the TOCOM.
>
>Scared by falling prices and encouraged to do so by
>their bullion bankers who are also their lenders, many
>gold mining companies respond by increasing their
>hedging activities, expanding forward sales and buying
>more gold put options. The forward sales, generally
>made with gold leased from central banks through
>bullion banks, add to the downward pressure on gold and
>provide fees to the bullion banks, augmented by further
>windfall profits on the loaned gold as the price
>continues to fall. The bullion banks earn further fees
>by selling put options to the mining companies, which
>frequently are forced to finance buying shorted-dated
>puts from the bullion banks by selling them long-dated
>calls.
>
>Trading around $280 in April 1999, gold is below the
>total cost of production for many mines and not far
>above the cash costs of quite a few. What is more,
>annual gold demand is now almost 4,000 tonnes,
>exceeding annual new mine production of 2,500 tonnes by
>almost 1500 tonnes. This deficit, building over several
>years, is largely filled by sales of gold leased from
>central banks by the bullion banks. Analysts trying to
>calculate the net short gold position of the bullion
>banks in early 1999 are coming up with some astonishing
>figures, some as high as 10,000 tonnes, equivalent to
>four full years of production.
>
>Since much of this leased gold is sold into the Asian
>jewelry market, particularly to India, which regularly
>absorbs 25-30 percent of annual world production, many
>question where all the gold necessary for repayment
>will be found. But at the beginning of 1999 some is
>expected to come from the proposed sale of more than
>300 tonnes by the International Monetary Fund to raise
>funds for aid to heavily indebted poor countries, an
>initiative strongly supported by the United States and
>Britain.
>
>On May 6, 1999, gold again nears $290 and is
>threatening to explode above $300 due in part to
>increasing doubts that the proposed IMF gold sales will
>be approved. Short positions are in grave peril. Then
>comes a wholly unexpected bombshell which will have
>even more unexpected consequences.
>
>On May 7, 1999, the British announce that the Bank of
>England on behalf of the British Treasury will sell 435
>tonnes of gold in a series of public auctions
>ostensibly to diversify its international monetary
>reserves. The manner of the British sales -- periodic
>public auctions instead of hidden sales through the
>Bank for International Settlements -- belie any effort
>to get top dollar and smack of intentional downward
>manipulation of the gold price. All indications are
>that these sales were ordered by the British government
>over the objection of Bank of England officials.
>
>Palpably spurious and inconsistent reasons for the
>sales are offered, but no persuasive ones. There is
>only one logical conclusion: the gold sales were
>directly ordered by the prime minister for unknown
>political or other reasons. What is more, his reasons
>are unlikely to have been frivolous. As leading
>supporters of the proposed IMF gold sales, the British
>clumsily put themselves in the position of front-
>running them, and ultimately the British sales are an
>important catalyst in forcing the IMF to change tack.
>
>For most knowledgeable gold market participants and
>observers, the British announcement is the smoking gun
>-- proof positive that the world gold market is being
>manipulated with official connivance and support. But
>what none yet suspects is that the BIS, the European
>Central Bank, and the central banks of the European
>Monetary Union countries are having serious second
>thoughts about the gold manipulation scheme.
>
>The British announcement quickly sends the gold price
>into near freefall toward $250. Gold mining companies
>panic. Urged on by the bullion banks, led again by
>Goldman Sachs, the miners add to their hedge positions.
>The very dangerous practice of financing short-dated
>puts with long-dated calls expands exponentially as
>financially strapped mining companies, threatened with
>reduction or loss of credit lines by their bullion
>bankers, are often left with little other choice. Then
>comes an even larger bombshell that takes the bullion
>bankers and their customers completely by surprise.
>Indeed, it is likely a watershed event for the entire
>world financial system, comparable only to the closing
>of the gold window in 1971.
>
>On September 26, 1999, 15 European central banks, led
>by the ECB, announce that they will limit their total
>combined gold sales over the next five years to 2,000
>tonnes, not to exceed 400 tonnes in any one year, and
>will not increase their gold lending or other gold
>derivatives activities . Besides the ECB and the 11
>members of the EMU, Britain, Switzerland, and Sweden
>are parties. The 2,000 tonnes include the remaining 365
>tonnes of British sales and 1,300 tonnes of previously
>proposed Swiss sales, leaving only 335 tonnes of
>possible new sales. The announcement, made in
>Washington following the IMF/World Bank annual meeting,
>is ironically christened the "Washington Agreement,"
>although the government in Washington played no role.
>However, the BIS, IMF, United States, and Japan are all
>expected to abide by it, and the BIS is expected to
>monitor it.
>
>The effect in the gold market is quick and dramatic.
>Within days, as some gold shorts rush to cover, the
>gold price jumps from around $265 to almost $330 and
>gold lease rates spike to more than 9 percent. By late
>October gold retreats back under $300, and a month
>later lease rates are almost back to normal levels. But
>the hugely overextended net short position in the gold
>market is clearly revealed and far from being resolved.
>
>Two heavily hedged gold mining companies, Ashanti and
>Cambior, are virtually bankrupt and in negotiations
>with their bullion bankers. Indeed, soon the entire
>rationale of hedging is under comprehensive review
>throughout the gold mining industry as shareholders
>rebel at practices that take away the upside of their
>gold investments.
>
>As the details of Ashanti's and Cambior's hedge books
>are disclosed, the recklessness of gold hedging
>strategies foisted onto to them by their bullion
>bankers becomes all too apparent. Ashanti's lead
>bullion banker, Goldman Sachs, is the subject of
>scathing comment, including allegations of serious
>conflicts of interest. See, among others, L. Barber &
>G. O'Connor, "How Goldman Sachs Helped Ruin and then
>Dismember Ashanti Gold," Financial Times (London), Dec.
>2, 1999, reprinted at:
>
>www.egroups.com/group/gata/299.html
>
>Clearly the most aggressive bullion bankers have been
>caught completely wrong-footed and totally unawares by
>the Washington Agreement. Significantly, rumor is that
>the agreement was hammered out secretly among the
>members of the EMU, the BIS, and Switzerland, that the
>British were given a chance to sign on after the fact,
>and that the United States was not informed until just
>before the Sunday announcement. For references to
>European press commentary on the genesis of the
>agreement, see W. Smith, "Operation Dollar Storm":
>
>www.gold-eagle.com/editorials_99/wsmith111099.html.
>
>Besides the three provisions relating directly to
>central bank activities in the gold market and one
>calling for review after five years, the Washington
>Agreement contains this statement: "Gold will remain an
>important element of global monetary reserves." The ECB
>and 11 EMU nations hold collectively around 12,500
>tonnes of gold reserves (almost 1.4 ounces per
>citizen), making the EMU as a whole by far the world's
>largest official holder of gold. What is more, unlike
>the United States, which values its gold stock of about
>8150 tonnes (under 1 ounce per citizen) at an
>unrealistic $42.22/oz., the EMU marks its gold reserves
>to market quarterly.
>
>The notion, shared by many, that the EMU would forever
>acquiesce in the trashing of its gold reserves by
>bullion banks operating in the largely paper gold
>markets of London, New York, and Tokyo appears in
>retrospect to have been incredibly naive. Indeed, a
>careful reading of the 69th annual report of the BIS
>issued in June 1999 suggests that European central
>bankers were already questioning the effectiveness and
>sustainability of Japan's low interest rate policy and
>were very concerned about the implications of the Long-
>Term Capital Management incident for the world payments
>system. With the euro successfully launched, they
>quickly lost reason to continue capping the gold price
>and became much more concerned about the increasingly
>parlous state of the gold banking system to which they
>were lending.
>
>Often referred to as the central banks' central bank,
>the BIS is not only the principal forum for discussion
>and cooperation among the world's central bankers but
>also the world's top gold bank. Established under
>international treaty in 1930 to facilitate payment of
>German war reparations, the BIS from its founding has
>kept its financial accounts in Swiss gold francs,
>making conversions at designated or market rates as
>appropriate. It holds approximately 200 tonnes of gold
>for its own account and records on its balance sheet
>separate gold deposit and gold liability accounts in
>connection with the banking services it provides to
>central banks and other international financial
>institutions. That the BIS in early 1999 was not as
>aware as gold analysts in the private sector of the
>bullion banks' dangerously leveraged condition is
>almost inconceivable.
>
>Fed Chairman Greenspan's letter to Senator Lieberman is
>highly significant in that it tends to negate the
>impression gained by many, including myself, that a
>rift had developed between the Anglo-American central
>banks and those of the EMU over gold. Rather, the Fed's
>position as expressed in the letter, together with the
>Bank of England's position that the decision to sell
>British gold came from Her Majesty's Treasury, implies
>a rift not among the major central banks but between
>them and the British and American governments operating
>through their treasury departments. In this connection,
>the Fed and the BOE labor under a handicap that does
>not affect the Europeans, for whereas the central banks
>of the EMU have direct legal responsibility for their
>nations' gold reserves, in both Britain and the U.S.
>this responsibility rest with their Treasury departments.
>
>What is more, a quite plausible scenario now appears to
>explain the British gold sales. Whether it is true or
>not, only a few high officials in the British and
>American governments and their bullion bankers are in a
>position to know. But on known and reasonably inferred
>facts, the following hypothesis can be constructed.
>
>The Exchange Stabilization Fund was writing gold call
>options for certain bullion bankers, principally those
>most active in selling futures and arranging forward
>sales: Goldman Sachs, Chase, et al. As of April 30,
>1999, it had outstanding a sizable position at strike
>prices in the $300 area. For writing these options in a
>generally falling market, it had net earnings from
>premiums, but in context these were not large amounts,
>at most a very few dollars per ounce. In the ESF's
>monthly financial reports required to be filed with the
>Senate and House Banking Committees, these amounts
>were listed as miscellaneous income.
>
>When gold threatened to explode over $300 in early May,
>and with IMF's proposed gold sales in trouble, the ESF
>found itself in much the same position as that of
>Ashanti and Cambior after announcement of the
>Washington Agreement. Gold call options previously sold
>for a few dollars an ounce threatened to cause losses
>many multiples of these amounts if the gold price
>jumped by $50 to $75. If settled in cash, exploding
>volatility premiums would add hugely to the loss,
>putting the effective strike price far above the
>nominal one. On the other hand, if settled in gold at
>the strike price, the ESF would have to deliver gold
>from U.S. reserves or go into the market to cover,
>adding more upward pressure to the gold price.
>
>Worse, unlike the modest premium income from sales of
>options, huge losses could not be hidden from Congress
>in the monthly financial reports to the House and
>Senate Banking Committees.
>
>Not to panic. The ESF, being under the direct control
>of the Treasury secretary and the president, has an
>option not available to others. Call the British Prime
>Minister and arrange for a very public official gold
>sale designed to kill the incipient gold price rally.
>And for God's sake don't let the Bank of England or the
>Fed know what is really afoot. If some of their
>inflation hawks knew the real situation in the gold
>market, they might be more inclined to raise interest
>rates.
>
>The plan worked, sort of. The immediate crisis was
>bridged. By now, depending on the maturity schedule of
>its options, the ESF may have substantially worked off
>its position. Indeed, a reduction in call options
>available from the ESF after the BOE's announcement may
>be what pushed the bullion banks to be so aggressive in
>trying to secure similar options from mining companies
>in the hedging panic that ensued. But if that was the
>strategy, the Washington Agreement undid it and left
>the bullion banks in dire peril. For an excellent
>discussion of their continuing exposure, see John
>Hathaway's latest essay, "Rich on Paper," at:
>
>www.tocqueville.com/brainstorms/brainstorm0055.shtml.
>
>If the foregoing hypothesis is correct, there will be
>time enough at a later date to analyze the full
>implications of a scandal of such magnitude. To do so
>now would be to get too far ahead of the story.
>Probably only an investigation by the U.S. Congress
>could really uncover the truth.
>
>But whether the hypothesis about manipulation of the
>gold price by the ESF is correct or not, the incredible
>overextension of the bullion banks is a fact that
>ultimately will have to be faced. Currently the
>European central banks through the BIS and within the
>limits of the Washington Agreement are engaged in a
>tightly controlled feed of modest amounts of gold into
>the market. Of the 335 remaining tonnes under the
>Washington Agreement, 300 tonnes at a rate of 100
>tonnes annually over the next three years were
>allocated to the Dutch on Dec. 6, of which 65 tonnes
>have already been sold. Where this gold is going and to
>whom is unknown, but most assume it is being used in
>large measure to alleviate critical shortages among the
>bullion banks. Some of these banks are divisions of
>very large and important commercial or investment
>banks, and thus may enjoy "too big to fail" protection.
>
>Plainly too, the American and British governments have
>put pressure on friendly gold-holding countries outside
>the Washington Agreement to supply gold to the market.
>For example, Kuwait announced that it was making its
>entire official reserve of 79 tonnes available to the
>BOE for lease into the market. Soon afterwards further
>new U.S. military aid to the country was disclosed.
>With regard to the Kuwaiti announcement, a top BIS
>official observed that it was so far outside normal
>practice as to permit only one conclusion: Someone was
>trying to manipulate the gold market.
>
>The bottom line is that whether as the result of greed,
>stupidity, breach of public trust, or some combination
>thereof, the fate of the bullion banks and the gold
>banking system itself has passed outside not only the
>bankers' control but also the power of the American and
>British governments. They are all hostages now:
>hostages to the continued good will of the European
>central banks, who could bury the exposed bullion banks
>tomorrow should they choose to do so; and hostages to
>events over which they have no control, whether as
>major as a stock market crash or as minor as a
>blockbuster bid at the next British auction.
>
>Given a sharp spike to $370/oz. or thereabouts, many
>believe the gold banking crisis would spiral out of
>control. Each periodic British auction is for 25 tonnes
>(803,750 ounces). At $370/oz. an entire auction could
>be had for less than $300 million, a trifling sum in
>modern finance. That may seem like a large premium to
>current prices of around $280-$290 but many gold
>analysts peg the true equilibrium price of gold today
>at between $500 and $600. Add in rumors of difficulty
>finding physical gold in size, and 25 tonnes of
>deliverable physical gold at $370 could almost look
>like a bargain.
>
>In any event, anyone -- friend or foe -- with a spare
>$300 million who cares to bid $370/oz. for the full
>amount of the next British auction could more than
>likely crash the gold banking system with consequences
>far more serious than those threatened by the failure
>of Long-Term Capital Management.
>
>Not long ago Marc Faber publicly suggested to Bill
>Gates the investment merits of switching his almost
>$100 billion of Microsoft shares into gold. M. Faber,
>"An Investment Tip for Bill G.," Forbes, Nov. 29, 1999,
>p. 248, also:
>
>www.forbes.com/forbesglobal/99/1115/0223099a.htm.
>
>My advice to Gates would be a little different: Start
>buying gold, leak that you are doing so, watch the
>price rise and governments sweat, bid early and high at
>the next British auction, and wait for a settlement
>offer you really like. No reason not to have both
>Microsoft shares and gold. Since the government likes
>free, unfettered markets, give them one -- in gold.
>
>The next auction is March 21, 2000, a date perhaps
>uncomfortably close to the ides of March for bullion
>bankers and would-be Caesars.
>
>-END-
>
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