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Y'all boys would benefit from doin' some readin' and studyin'.
Firstly, have a look at the traditional way that
semi-paranoid electronics manufacturers have been
thwarting reverse engineers (customers and competitors)
for the last 40 years. To name a simple example,
think back to transistorized ultra high end audio
equipment ($5000 phono preamps etc.) built in the
1970's. The Mark Levinson JC-2 for example.
How did they make it difficult / impossible to
reverse engineer their designs? (These were
15 discrete transistors + 20 resistors + 10
capacitors on a 3" x 7" single sided PCB.)
How would YOU make it difficult to reverse engineer
a PCB, using 1970's technology?
The answer, my friend, is not blowin in the wind.
Rather it is in the Digi-Key catalog.
http://parts.digikey.com/1/parts-kws/potting-compound
Manufacturer's datasheet
http://www.shop3m.com/62326614351.html
Secondly, let go of the assumption that the only way
to make a hardware gizmo to execute some portion of
a trading system, is to use a microprocessor or FPGA
whose programming code is stored off-chip in a
configuration ROM of some kind.
Just to name one counterexample (I bet YOU can think
of lots more), you _could_ implement your hardware
doodad using an Altera MAX-3000 CPLD device.
(data sheet: http://www.altera.com/literature/ds/m3000a.pdf )
This little beauty doesn't have or need an external
configuration ROM. If there's no ROM on the dongle,
there's no ROM for the bad guy to desolder and read
out at his leisure. The MAX-3000 stores its programming
code right in its own on-chip EEPROM.
Furthermore, Altera has provided a mechanism called the
Security Bit that disables reading-out the programming
code. From page 21 of the data sheet:
$ Design Security
$
$ All MAX 3000A devices contain a programmable security bit
$ that controls access to the data programmed into the device.
$ When this bit is programmed, a design implemented in the
$ device cannot be copied or retrieved. This feature provides
$ a high level of design security because programmed data
$ within EEPROM cells is invisible. The security bit that
$ controls this function, as well as all other programmed
$ data, is reset only when the device is reprogrammed.
Put these two simple ideas together: (1) semi-paranoid
physical security; (2) Security-bit protected programming
code;
and you get something that is EXTREMELY DIFFICULT to reverse
engineer. Could the CIA reverse engineer it if they really
Really wanted to, and if they deployed all their resources
on the task? Of course.
Could some Russian trader who collects source code of vendor
trading systems, and sells 500 pirated systems on a CD for
$99, reverse engineer it? NFW. Could the R&D Department
at Tudor Jones Investments, or Renaissance Technologies, or
Goldman Sachs, or Soros Quantum Fund II, reverse engineer
it? Extremely doubtful. The cost would be prohibitive
(consultant hours + lab equipment) AND they would raise
your suspicions when they start to repeatedly ask for
another dongle, saying they "accidentally broke" or
"lost" the last one. (When in fact they accidentally
destroyed it in their lab, trying to reverse engineer it).
By the way, I recommend laying out some Frightening Symbols
on your PC Board, which will show up if the Bad Guy takes
an X-Ray of your dongle. I suggest a hammer and sickle
(from Soviet era communist flags), or a Bio-Hazard symbol,
and-or one or two icons from the cult/religion called
Satanism. That'll make them think twice about digging in!
Mark Johnson
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