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One must identify the rules men must follow in their thinking if
knowledge, rather than error or delusion is their goal. These rules
can be condensed into one general principle: thinking, to be valid,
must adhere to reality. Or, in the memorable words of the old Dragnet
TV series, which can serve as the motto of all reality-oriented
thought: "Just give us the facts, ma'am." But how does one reach
"just the facts"? The answer lies in the concept of Objectiveness;
it requires that one grasp the full philosophic meaning and
implication of this concept. When one grasps this concept, one will
have an invaluable tool enabling one to assess and, if necessary,
improve the quality of one's own thinking.
The concept of "objective" which applies as a norm to all rational
cognition, has its roots in the theory of concepts. "Objectivity"
arises because concepts are formed by a specific process and, as a
result, bear a specific kind of relationship to reality.
The conceptual faculty is an instrument that reduces units by ommiting
measurements. Or: concepts are a human method - of integrating
preceptual data. Or: concepts are a device of our consciousness -
to deal with existents. All these formulations point to a crucial
fact. Concepts do not pertain to consciousness alone or to existence
alone; they are products of a specific kind of relationshiop between
the two. Abstractions are products of man's faculty of cognition and
would not exist without it. But a faculty of cognition is concerned
to grasp reality, and must, therefore, adhere to reality.
One the one hand, there is a uniquely human contribution to the
conceptual level of awareness, one that has no counter part in the
process of sense perception. In contrast to perception,
conceptualization is not an automatic reaction to stimuli; it is not
a passive gazing that awaits the infallible imprinitng on the mind of
some external entity. Concept formation and use is precisely the
realm that is not automatic or infallible, but volitional. In order
to conceoptualize, a man must expend effort; he must engage in the
kind of mental work that no stimulus can necessitate. He must
struggle to relate, connect, process an ever-growing range of data-
and he must learn to do it correctly. Further: in such processing,
the basic method he uses, measurement-ommission, is dictated by the
nature of his cognitive faculty, not by reality. The result is a
human prespective of things, not a revelation of a special sort of
entity or attribute intrinsic in the world apart from man. Take away
the mechanism of human consciousness, and the realm of concepts,
universals, abstractions is thereby erased. The concretes that
exist, the objects of perception, would still remain-as concretes;
but the perspective that regards them as units would be gone.
On the other hand, consciousness is the faculty of grasping that which
is, and there is a metaphysical basis for concepts. There is
something the same in reality about the units of a concept: their
characteristics, which differ in various instances only in regard to
their measurements. This is a fact about the concretes, not a
creation of man. We can integrate preceptual entities into a mental
unit only because these entities actually posses the same
characteristics. We can treat existents as the same in a specified
respect only because they are the same in that respect.
Concepts are condensations of data formed by a volitional process in
accordance with a human "method." The method is "human" because it
expresses man's distinctive form of consciousness; it arises because
of the nature and cognitive needs of man's mind. At the same time,
the method (properly employed) conforms at each setp to facts;
otherwise it would be irrelevant to a cognitive need. Man, therefore,
cannot project the products of this method outward, into reality apart
from man-nor can he detach them from reality, either. Such products
represent a special kind of union: they represent reality as
processed by human consiciousness. This is the status described as
"Objective."
The element of volition is crucial here. Percepts, too, are products
of a relationship between existence and consciousness: they are a
grasp of entities in a specific sensory form. But percepts are
automatic; although they require a sequence of physiological steps,
they involve no deliberate "method" of cognition and cannot depart
from reality. Normative terms, therfore, such as "objective" and
"subjective," are inapplicable to them.
If someone asks: where is a preceptual object, eg., a man? it is
accurate, even though we do perceive in a certain form, to answer:
the object is out there, in the world. But, if someone asks: where
is a conceptual object, eg., manness? the answer: such an object is
neither "in the world" nor "in the eye of the beholder." Manness or
any other "universal," is facts of the world, it is concretes-as
reduced to a unit not by the eye, but by the mind of a conceptual
being.
Essenses are not attributes marked out by nature apart from man.
"Essential" is not metaphysical, but an epistemological term.
"Essential" designates characteristics that perform a certain function
in connection with human conceptualization. The function is to
differentiate and condense various bodies of data, and the
characteristics that perfrom this function in one cognitive context
may not do so in another. Since the category of "essence" arises
because of a need of man's consciousness, the "essential" in each
context has to reflect the state of human knowledge.
Since defnitions are condensations of observed data, however, they are
determined by such data; they are not arbitrary; they flow from the
facts of the case. In this respect, definitions are "empirical"
statements, and reality is the standard of what is essential.
Definitions are statements of factual data-as condensed by a human
consciousness in accordance with the needs of a human "method" of
cognition. Like concepts, therefore, essences are products of a
volitional relationship between existence and consciousness; they too
(properly formed) are "objective."
In the traditional (Platonic) viewpoint, every entity must have an
essence or definition. This is not true. Since the designation of
essential arises only as an aid to the conceptualizing process, it is
inapplicable apart from that process. Concretes that have not been
integrated into a concept have no "essence"; inthese cases there is
no need or possiblity of a definition.
Where, philosophers are wont to ask, does one draw the line in
grouping concretes that are neither essential the same (as are a red
table and a black one) not essentially different (as are a table and a
chair)? "Suppose"-as a well-known professor of philosophy
asked-"someone invents a "hanging table": an object with a flat, level
surface designed to hold other objects, but hangs from the ceiling by
chains, rather than resting on 3 legs on the floor. Is it "really' a
table or not? And how in the world could anyone know?
Precisely the "hanger" is borderline, one has several options. Since
the entity does have some significant similarities to tables, one may
choose to subsume it under that concept (which would require a
contextual alteration in one's definition of "table"). Or; since the
entity does have some significant differences from tables, one may
form a new concept to designate it. Or: since the entity is not
widespread and is of no importance in this regard to further
cognition, one may and probably would choose niether option. One need
not designate it by any one concept, old or new, but may identify it
instead by a descriptive phrase, which is exactly what the professor
did in posing his question.
The borderline-case problem is no problem-not if one accepts an
objective view of concepts and therefore of essenses, with the
clasificatory options this makes possible.
Conceptual options, it must be noted, exist only within certain
defined limits. They exist only where the facts of reality can be
organized by men in different ways without this making any cognitive
difference or leading to any contradiction. In such cases, all the
alternative modes of handling the facts are in accordance with
reality. This situation provides no foothold for subjectivism to
enter.
What is knowledge and how does man acquire it? The objective approach
to concepts leads to the view that, beyond the preceptual level,
knowledge is the grasp of an object through an active, reality-based
process or method chosen by the subject. Concepts, like every other
mode of cognition, therefore, is the grasp, not the creation, of an
object. Beyond the preceptual level, however, such conformity can be
attained only by a complex process of abstraction and integration.
Since this process is not automatic, it is not automatically right,
either. Man cannot, therefore adopt a passive policy, one of waiting
for the truth to enter his mind. In the use of a concept, as in its
formation, he must choose and act. He must initiate step-by-step
cognitive function; he must be willing to expend the effort required
by each step; and he must choose the step carefully. They must
constitute a "method" that makes it possible for man's consciousness,
when dealing with abstraction, to achieve by deliberate policy that is
not guaranteed to it automatically: to remain in contact with the
realm of reality.
Man does not need a "method" of cognition, mystics say, because on the
most important matters he is incapable of error; if he turns his mind
over to God, he is automatically right. Man is not automatically
right, skeptics say, so his conclusions are untrustworthy and he
cannot discover any "method"; in this view, man is incapable of
truth. Man is not automatically right, is the correct reply by
Objectivism to both schools, and for this very reason he must define
a "method" of cognition, a "method" that will guide his mental
processes properly and thereby make a fallible being capable of truth.
For a volitional, conceptual consciousness, a "method" of knowing
reality is both necessary and possible. The method must reflect 2
factors: the facts of external reality and the nature of man's
consciousness. It must reflect the first, because consciousness is
not a self-contained entity; it is the faculty of perceiving that
which exists. The method must reflect the 2nd factor, because
consciousness has identity; the mind is not blank receptivity; it is
a certain kind of integrating mechanism, and it must act accordingly.
The conslusion: to be "objective" in one's conceptual activities is
volitionally to adhere to reality by following certain rules of
method, a method based on facts and appropriate to man's form of
cognition. People often speak of "objective reality." In this usage,
which is harmless, "objective" means "independent of consciousness."
The actual purpose of the concept, however, is to be found not in
metaphysics, but in epistemology. Strictly speaking, existents are
not objective; they simply are. It is minds, and specifically
conceptual processes, that are objective-or subjective.
If objectivity requires a method of cognition, what is it? The answer
in a word is: logic. Logic is a volitional consciousnes's method of
conforming to reality. It is the method of reason. Logic is the art
of noncontradictory identificaton. Knowledge is the "grasp" of an
object. To grasp, we must identify, ie., to discover in some form the
identiry of that which exists. On the perceptual level, one learns
only that an entity is, not what it is.
If man knew everything about reality in a single insight, logic would
be needless. If man reached conceptual truth as he does preceptual
fact, in a succession of unconnected self evidencies, logic would be
needless. This, however, is not the nature of a conceptual being. We
organize sense data in steps and in a definite order, building new
integrations on earlier ones. It is for this reason that a method of
moving from one step to the next is required. That is what logic
provides. The method of logic, therefore, does reflect the nature and
needs of man's consciousness. It also reflects the other factor
essential to a proper method: the facts of external reality. The
principle which logic provides to guide man's mental steps is the
fundamental law of reality.
Intrincism holds that universals are real ("out there"); subjectivism
holds that they are nominal ("in here," in the sense of being
arbitrary linguistic creations). In one view, concepts represent
phenomena of existence apart from consciousness. In the other view,
they represent phenomena of consciousness apart from existence.
The intrinsicists, eager to ground human thought in the world of
fact, project the products of man's conceptual activity outward, into
reality apart from man. The subjectivists, rebelling against such
projection, give up the quest for a grounding; man's conceptual
products, they typically declare, being his chosen creations, his own
prespective on things, are detached from reality. Neither school
understands that such products, by their very nature, reflect both
fact and choice, both existents and man's perspective on them, both
reality AND human consciousness.
The objective approach to concepts leads to the view that knowledge is
the grasp of an object through an active, reality based process or
method chosen by the subject. Intrincism leads to the view that
knowledge is the grasp of an object through the passive absorption of
revelations. Subjectivism leads to the view that knowledge is the
creation of an object through the active inner processes of the
subject.
The intrincist regards knowledge, in effect, as a series of
thunderbolts from the beyond. In this view, each item (or set of
items) is revealed to man as a separate, contextless deliverance.
The subjectivist regards knowledge as a series of thunderbolts
emanating from within human consciousness, whether personal or
social. In this view, each item or set is invented as a separate,
arbitrary caprice. Neither of these approaches can identify the
cognitive necessity of integration, of reduction, of proof. Left to
its own devices, neither feels the need of an "art of
noncontradictory identification."
Logic is the method of achieving objectivity. This is the knowledge
that is necessary to convert objectivity from elusive ideal to normal
actuality. It is this knowledge that enables a man not only to base
his conclusions on reality, but to do it consciously and methodically-
to know that he is doing it and by what means-i.e., to be in control
of the process of cognition.
rgds, Pal
--- In amibroker@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "fgornati" <francogornati@xxxx>
wrote:
> --- In amibroker@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "quanttrader714"
> <quanttrader714@xxxx> wrote:
> > Good luck in lala land.
>
> Hi Mark, sorry about that post. Not fair and I regretted it just as
I
> hit the send button.
> The distinction about objectivity and subjectivity about price data
> is ambiguous. Data are certain, as long as they have they have been
> well recorded, but per se are of little significance. You need a
> model, a theory to interpret them. When you choose to apply a trend
> definition you are interpreting them in a subjective way, someone
> else could talk of trends in prices as 'windmills of the mind'.
> Every mechanical rule is a subjective choice made upon a theory. The
> fact that is applied sistematically doesn't mean it's objective.
It's
> only measurable as long as it applies to the past.
> I think that prices are a historical process and there is nothing
> like an urn and a set of white and black balls. The system is open
> and undefined and when someone makes only use of past prices he's
> simply deciding to act on the basis of a well defined set of
> information, on the ground of a theory that assumes the existence of
> a stable generating process, and is forming his expectation,
positive
> or negative, accordingly.
> In all this process there is not so much objectivity, in my opinion.
>
>
> in about the future he's moving along the same line as one
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